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A Plea For The Total Ban Of Land
Mines By International Treaty
NORMAN B. SMITH*
I. INTRODUCTION
A child picks up a curiously-shaped plastic object lying on the
ground; her arms are blown off, she is blinded, and she receives
horribly disfiguring facial wounds. A herdsman driving his cattle
to water hears an ominous clicking noise underfoot, and, in a
blinding flash, one of his legs is destroyed up to the knee, his other
foot is mangled beyond repair, and his testicles are torn off. A
woman, while gathering firewood, is suddenly enveloped in an
explosive upsurge and suffers a spinal injury, rendering her a
quadriplegic for life.
Victims of land mine1 explosions are often innocent civilians,2
who inadvertently cause the detonation long after military forces
plant the mines. 3  Unfortunately, in recent years, land mine
warfare strategy has marked civilians as the intended targets, with
the purpose to terrorize the population or to deny the use of
territory.4
* B.A., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; LLB., Harvard Law School, 1965;
Member, North Carolina Bar, Greensboro Bar, and 18th Judicial District Bar.
1. Although the term "land mine" is used to refer to both antipersonnel and antitank
mines, this Article focuses on antipersonnel mines. The term "mines" is meant to be
synonymous with land mines and not to include underwater mines unless otherwise
indicated.
2. Jack H. McCall, Jr., Infernal Machines and Hidden Death: International Law and
Limits on the Indiscriminate Use of Land Mine Warfare, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 229,
231, 244-52 (1994).
3. These explosions sometimes occur months or even years after the mines have been
placed. The American Claymore mine, for example, retains 70% effectiveness after more
than twenty years in the ground. THE ARMS PROJECr OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH &
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY 66 (1993)
[hereinafter THE ARMS PROJECT].
4. Id.
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Regardless of whether civilian deaths and injuries are
intended, or are simply reasonably expected by land mine warfare,
such casualties conflict with well-established doctrines of interna-
tional law. These doctrines condemn unnecessary infliction of
suffering, casualties disproportionate to military advantages, failure
to protect civilians, use of non-targeted and indiscriminate
weapons, and unjustified taking of life and invasion of bodily
integrity.
The 1980 Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons ("Conventional Weapons
Treaty")5 aims, in part, to regulate land mines. A number of
states that incorporate heavy usage of land mines in their military
strategy, however, have not ratified the treaty.6 More importantly,
the Conventional Weapons Treaty fails to regulate effectively the
use of land mines.
This Article surveys the relentless tragedy wrought by the
indiscriminate use of land mines and the conflict such use presents
with principles of international law. Part II of this Article briefly
describes the nature and types of land mines and discusses their
toll in terms of human casualties and economic costs. Part III
examines principles of customary international law in the context
of the use of land mines. Part IV briefly outlines the shortcomings
of the Conventional Weapons Treaty.7 Part V calls for a new
international treaty that absolutely bans land mines and mentions
encouraging steps recently taken by several nations to cease
international trade of land mines. This Article concludes that in
order to uphold the principles of customary international law, the
International Conference on Conventional Weapons, convening in
1995, must produce a treaty that completely and effectively
prohibits the production, possession, and use of land mines.
5. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, opened for signature, Apr. 10, 1981, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.95/15, 19 I.L.M. 1529,
1530 (hereinafter Conventional Weapons Treaty).
6. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. The United States is one of these
nations. United States military strategy incorporates the use of land mines. McCall, supra
note 2, at 233 n.25 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 5-100, ENGINEER COMBAT
OPERATIONS 48 (1988)). The United States signed the Conventional Weapons Treaty;
however, it did not ratify the treaty. Id. at 265.
7. For an extensive review of the Conventional Weapons Treaty as it relates to the
use of land mines, see McCall, supra note 2, at 252-66.
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II. LAND MINES AND THEIR UNCONSCIONABLE HUMAN TOLL
A "land mine" is defined as "any munition placed under, on,
or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be
detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a
person or vehicle."8 Military forces employ many different types
of land mines. Principal varieties of mines include blast mines,
which explode when stepped upon; fragmentation mines, which
disperse fragments in a certain radius or direction when a tripwire
is engaged; and bounding mines, which are projected upwards by
a small charge, expelling their fragments by means of a second
explosion at the height of one meter or more.9
The U.S. arsenal of land mines reflects the diversity of land
mines' purposes and mechanisms. The American-built Claymore
Mine propels hundreds of steel balls that inflict fatal wounds from
a distance of up to 50 meters and incapacitating wounds from a
distance of up to 100 meters.1" The M16A1, another antiperson-
nel mine used by the United States Army, is designed to incapaci-
tate rather than kill and is made of a plastic body that frustrates
detection and clearance.11
The low manufacturing cost of land mines makes them an
extremely affordable commodity for units ranging from terrorist
groups to well-equipped national armies.12 China's popular Type
72 mines sell for less than $3.00 each.1 3 Brazilian and Pakistani
models range from $6.00 to $7.00.14 The United States' Claymore
M18A1 sells for $27.50.15
Over the past twenty-five years, land mines have been
manufactured at a rate of five to ten million per year.1 6 During
this same period, approximately 100 companies and government
8. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and
Other Devices, annexed to Conventional Weapons Treaty, supra note 5, at 1530.
9. THE ARMS PROJECr, supra note 3, at 19-20.
10. Id at 66.
11. Id at 68-69. "[A] wounded soldier will be a noisier and more morale-sapping
distraction for his comrades than a dead soldier, and a burden to his own side's medical
and logistic services." P.R. COURTNEY-GREEN, AMMUNITION FOR THE LAND BATTLE 172
(1991).
12. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 18.
13. Id at 56.
14. Id
15. Id
16. Id at 49.
19951 509
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
agencies produced more than 340 different types of antipersonnel
mines.1 At least forty-one companies or government agencies in
twenty-nine countries have exported land mines.'"
The total number of mines that exist in the world today is
estimated at more than 100 million, with some estimates exceeding
200 million. 9 Current estimates of the number of deployed
mines range from 65 to 200 million.20 As many as twenty million
mines may have been laid in the Angolan civil war; ten to thirty
million land mines were planted in Afghanistan during the 1980's;
four to seven million uncleared land mines remain in Cambodia;
and the recent fighting in former Yugoslavia has left approximately
two million mines in the soil.2 ' These deployments and others
have emplaced mines in the soil of sixty-two nations.22
Land mines kill or wound more than 7800 people per year.'
In some parts of the world, land mine casualties have reached
epidemic proportions. In 1990 alone, at least 6000 Cambodians
suffered amputations resulting from land mine explosions.24 The
ratio of amputees from land mines to total population are 1:236 in
Cambodia; 1:470 in Angola; 1:1000 in northern Somalia; and 1:2500
in Vietnam.25 The carnage caused by land mines is not confined
to these recently-mined third world countries where mine clearing
operations have failed to remove most land mines. Land mines
laid in Poland during World War II have resulted in approximately
4000 deaths and about 9000 injuries to civilians in recent years.
Depending upon a person's proximity to a land mind when it
explodes, there are three common forms of bodily injury caused by
land mine explosions. Traumatic or surgical amputation of one or
both lower limbs usually occurs from standing on a buried mine
17. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 36.
18. Id at 59.
19. Id at 51.
20. Id at 50.
21. Id at 10, 51-52, 165.
22. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 50.
23. The American Red Cross estimates that 800 people are killed and 450 are injured
each month by land mines. Id, app. 6 (statement by Elizabeth Dole, President of the
American Red Cross, on the Use of Antipersonnel Mines).
24. Id at 166.
25. Id at 126.
26. WORKING PAPERS ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE
DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS 28
(1978).
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which detonates.27 Multiple fragments of a mine set off nearby
causes random, penetrating injuries, often including injuries to the
head, neck, chest, and abdomen, and injuries that may also require
surgical amputation of limbs.2" Injuries to the arm and face often
result from handling mines.29 Blindness and other eye injuries
will often result from all three of these experiences.3"
Treatment of mine-inflicted injuries is complicated further by
the severity of the wounds and the poor medical conditions that
exist in many of the areas where mines are detonated. Many of
these areas are highly contaminated.31 Additionally, because the
victims often live in remote areas, transporting victims to facilities
for proper medical care takes anywhere from six to thirty-six
hours.32
Mine clearance is an expensive, slow, dangerous undertaking
that often fails to detect and remove mines. It is estimated that
mine clearance costs between $300 and $1000 per mine.33 These
costs create heavy burdens for some economically disadvantaged
third-world countries that render complete mine clearance
impossible. For example, removing all emplaced land mines in
Cambodia would require the combined income of all Cambodians
over a period of five to seven years. 4
Contemporary minelaying is often accomplished by remote
means, such as aircraft, artillery, and specialty vehicles, rather than
by manual emplacement.35 One mine scattering system can
disseminate 1750 mines per minute.36 The ratio of emplacement
time to removal time for land-laid mines is about 1:100.
37
27. Robin M.Coupland & Adrian Korver, Injuries from Antipersonnel Mines: The
experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 303 BRIT. MED. J. 1509, 1511
(1991). One study found the incidence of lower limb amputations to be 84%. Jorma
Rautio et al., Afghan War Wounded- Experience with 200 Cases, 28 J. TRAUMA 523-25
(1988).
28. Rautio, supra note 27, at 523-25.
29. Id
30. Id
31. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 121.
32. Id at 127.
33. Id at 235.
34. Id. at 235, 251. Mine removal in Cambodia is not feasible; in fact, it has been
estimated that it would take 100 years to remove all the land mines in Cambodia. Id at
179.
35. Id at 26.
36. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 41.
37. Id at 235.
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Clearing mines spread in a single hour by the Valsella system
could take weeks or months." At this rate, any substantial
clearing of the 65 to 200 million mines now emplaced worldwide
could take decades. Yet, thousands of new land mines are being
laid daily, vastly exceeding the number being removed."
Complete and effective mine removal is complicated further
by the construction of modem mines which have become virtually
resistant to mine-clearing operations. In the Gulf War, Iraq used
an Italian-produced mine that was impervious to blasting mine-
clearing techniques. A newer Italian-produced model comes
equipped with an electronic anti-disturbance device that detonates
if one attempts to deactivate the mine.' At least eighteen
countries have produced mines with low or minimum metal
content, often making the mine undetectable by conventional mine
detecting gear with magnetic sensors.4"
Submunitions are the functional equivalent of land mines and
must also be considered. Submunitions consist of bomblets, cluster
bombs, and grenades delivered by aircraft, surface artillery, and
rockets.42 Typically, thousands of submunitions are dispersed into
a small area. It is estimated that thirty million submunitions were
expended during the Gulf War. It is also estimated that the
United States has manufactured 750 million submunitions for
artillery and rockets alone.43 As much as ten to twenty percent
of dispersed submunitions fail to explode." At the conclusion of
the Gulf War, therefore, millions of small live explosive charges
likely remained on the ground.45 These charges, if stepped upon
38. Id
39. Id at 234. Mine clearing techniques include hand prodding, the most effective and
widespread method in use, but a very dangerous one. Magnetic actuated mine detectors
are frequently used, but are not effective against low or minimum metal mines. The latter
types, however, can be located by specially trained dogs. Certain mechanical devices, such
as flails, rollers, and plows, as well as explosives, are of limited reliability and are fairly
expensive. Id at 237-57.
40. Id at 78.
41. THE ARMS PROJECr, supra note 3, at 27-28, 33 (stating that the latest mine
detection equipment is 60-90% effective in finding minimum-metal mines), 43, 241-42.
42. Id at 347.
43. Id
44. Id.
45. Id. Ironically, some military authorities argue that unexploded submunitions pose
such a great threat in and of themselves, that land mines are relatively less of a concern.
U.S. ARMY PAPER ON THE UTILrrY OF MINES 2 (1994) (on file with Loyola of Los
Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal) [hereinafter U.S. ARMY PAPER].
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or otherwise disturbed, could cause serious bodily injury or
death.'
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO LAND
MINES
In addition to treaties, customary international law plays an
essential role in regulating the use of arms in warfare. As stated
by the Nuremburg Tribunal, "[t]he law of war is to be found not
only in treaties, but in the custom and practices of states which
gradually obtained universal recognition and from the general
principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military
courts."47 Land mines pose such a threat to non-combatants that
these weapons may violate principles of customary international
law.
A. Humanity
Inflicting unnecessary suffering upon persons has long been
recognized as a breach of international law. Direct references to
this principle of humanity are contained in the 1868 Declaration of
St. Petersburg ("1868 Declaration"),' the Convention (II) with
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land ("Hague
11"),49 and the Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land ("Hague IV").50 The 1868 Declaration
states, in part:
That the only legitimate object which states should
endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military
force of the enemy; ....
These authorities expect that prohibition of land mines would lead to greater use of
submunitions, resulting in greater numbers of civilian casualties from unexploded
submunitions than from land mines. Id.
46. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 347.
47. In re Goering and Others, 13 Ann. Dig. 203,209 (Int'l Military Trib., Nuremburg,
Germany, 1946).
48. 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (Supp. 1907) [hereinafter
SL Petersburg Decleration].
49. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CoNFLICrS 69 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman
eds., 3d rev. ed. 1988) [hereinafter Hague II].
50. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTs, supra note 49, at 69 [hereinafter Hague
IV].
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That this object would be exceeded by the employment of
arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be
contrary to the laws of humanity."'
Article 23(e) of Hague II prohibits the use of "arms, projectiles, or
material of a nature to cause superfluous injury."5  Hague IV
invokes "the principles of the law of nations, as they result from
the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.,
5 3
The constraints placed on warfare by the laws of humanity
include the avoidance of unnecessary suffering and the
minimization of the horrors of warfare.' Other important
principles of the law of war flow from and build upon the basic
concept of humanity. These include proportionality of the military
objective to the damage inflicted, protection of civilians, avoidance
of weapons or methods which are non-targeted or indiscriminate
in their effect, as well as general rights of life and personal
security.
This concept of humanity has inspired the drafters of some
treaties to incorporate provisions that outlaw the use of certain
types of weapons. 5 These weapons include: lightweight explod-
ing projectiles, prohibited by the Declaration of St. Petersburg;
5 6
dum dum bullets,57 outlawed by Hague 11;58 and poisonous gas
51. Id. at 69.
52. Hague II, supra note 48, art. 23(e)49, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, at 83.
53. Hague IV, supra note 49, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS at 69.
See also Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4,22 (Apr. 9) (referring to "elementary considerations
of humanity" as a "general and well-recognized" principle and that such considerations are
to be "more exacting in peace than in war...").
54. Among the core rules from the Nuremburg Judgment is the prohibition against
weapons or tactics that cause unnecessary or aggravated devastation and suffering. Burns
H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Illegality in Context, 13 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 3-4 (1983).
55. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 264.
56. The St. Petersburg Declaration banned explosive or inflammable projectiles
weighing below 400 grams. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 48, at 96.
57. "Dum dum bullets" owe their name to the British Indian Arsenal of Dum-Dum,
near Calcutta, where they were first manufactured. DOCuMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR
39 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1982). Such bullets "expand or flatten easily
in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the
core or is pierced with incisions." Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July
29, 1899, reprinted in id., at 40.
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and bacteriological warfare, condemned by the Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Uses in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare ("Protocol
of 1925"). 9
Land mine explosions can produce fatal injuries, and the
resulting death may be torturous and prolonged. Although one
may survive a land mine explosion, the victim is often left maimed
and disfigured. As noted before, explosions from land mines sever
limbs, produce paralysis, cause blindness, and sometimes drive
their victims into irreversible psychosis.6
The threat of horrible injuries, torture, and death from land
mines often deters troops from entering the battlefield. 61  This
deterrent effect is one reason why many military strategists deem
these weapons among the most important in their land warfare
58. Bullets which have incomplete hard outer casings and expand on impact are
banned by Convention (VI) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 57, at 40.
59. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Uses in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare ("1925 Geneva Protocol"), June
17, 1925, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 57, at 139. The
First Hague Conference of 1899 adopted a declaration against the use of "projectiles the
sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases." Declaration (IV,
2) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra
note 49, at 105. The Germans after World War I argued that they did not violate this
provision because they spread gas by canister rather than by projectile. Although this
argument has been accepted by one authority, Note, The Law of Chemical Warfare, 10
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889, 908 (1942), it has been largely rejected by the scholarly
community. Howard S. Levie, Humanitarian Restrictions on Chemical and Biological
Weapons, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 1192, 1194 (1982). Another treaty concerning the use of
poisonous gas during war, The Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious
Gases, was adopted in 1922. This treaty, however, never became effective because France
did not ratify it. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 49, at 877. The 1925 treaty
outlawing poison gas and germ warfare was recognized in the Nuremburg Judgment to be
fully binding and enforceable. Weston, supra note 54, at 3-4. A 1970 United Nations
resolution declared the use of any chemical or biological agents in an armed conflict to be
contrary to generally recognized rules of international law. 24 U.N. GAOR, at 16, 24th
Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1970). In 1975, a treaty was entered into force
totally banning production of bacterial warfare agents and requiring their destruction.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, and on their Destruction, opened for
signature, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062. The production of chemical
warfare agents, as distinguished from their use, continues to be permitted. Harry H.
Almond, Control over Chemical Weapons - Personal Perspectives on the Emerging United
States Position, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 1203, 1205 (1982).
60. Robin M. Coupland et al., Injuries from Antipersonnel Mines: The Experience of
the International Committee of the Red Cross, 303 BRrr. MED. J. 1509 (1991).
61. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 21.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
arsenal.62 Land mines produce effects similar to those of small
size exploding bullets and dum dum bullets. Accordingly, land
mines may violate the international legal principle of humanity as
do small size exploding bullets and dum dum bullets.
B. Military Necessity and Proportionality
The purpose of warfare is to destroy or to weaken the military
strength of the enemy. "[O]nly such destruction [is authorized] as
is necessary, relevant, and proportionate to the prompt realization
of legitimate belligerent objectives."' The doctrine of military
necessity was mentioned in the Instruction for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field ("Lieber Instructions"),
the first attempt to codify the laws of war.' The Lieber Instruc-
tions restricted the army to those measures "indispensable for
securing the ends of war."' Customary international law also
forbids infliction of harm that exceeds the military advantage
sought to be gained.'
Some invoke the principles of military necessity and propor-
tionality to advocate against prohibition of land mines. They argue
that mine fields serve important military goals by slowing or
stopping enemy advances, channelling enemy movements into
more easily-defended routes, conserving forces and firepower, and
62. U.S. ARMY PAPER, supra note 45, at 2.
63. MYRES McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 72 (1961).
64. The Lieber Instructions were prepared by Francis Lieber during the American Civil
War and promulgated by President Lincoln to govern the conduct of war by the Union
Army. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 49, at 3. The Lieber Instructions
strongly influenced Hague II and Hague IV. Id.
65. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, art.
14, April 24, 1863, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 49, at 6. The
Lieber Code made it clear that the measures used must also be "lawful according to the
modern law and usages of war." Id. Unquestionably, international law continues to
require both military necessity and adherence to applicable humanitarian or other laws of
war before a military action can be undertaken. In other words, the law of war is not
overcome by "military necessity." See U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL, FM 27-
10, The Law of Land Warfare, para. 3a (1956) [hereinafter ARMY FIELD MANUAL].
Professor Francis Lieber had fought with the Prussians at Waterloo in 1815. H.
MCCOUBREY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICTS 217 (1992).
66. JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARI-
AN LAW 62 (1985); EDWARD K. KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT: PERSONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 38-39 (1992); Bernard L.
Brown, The Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian Law of Warfare: Recent Efforts
at Codification, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 134 (1976).
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minimizing casualties. 67 They further contend that proportionality
is further achieved by adherence to the Conventional Weapons
Treaty's requirements of reporting, recording, and marking and of
using mines that automatically self-destruct.(' Yet, the grave
inadequacies of these requirements69 demonstrate the fallacy of
these arguments. These provisions have been widely disobeyed.7 °
Moreover, land mine deactivation is never foolproof, and a
substantial number of injuries and fatalities could result from the
supposedly deactivated mines.7
Some military experts believe that land mines do not achieve
important military goals. Former United States Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara reported that land mines killed one-
fifth to one-third of all American soldiers in Vietnam, while
relatively few enemy troops were killed or disabled by these
weapons." At a 1993 symposium on land mines, former Marine
Corps Commandant, General Alfred Gray, Jr., stated that he knew
of no situation in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, or the Gulf War where
mine warfare effectively channelized the enemy and brought them
into a destructible pattern.7 3 General Gray further stated that he
was not aware of any operational advantage from widespread
deployment of mines and cited many examples where American
soldiers were trapped in their own mine fields.74
There is no clear consensus that an army will necessarily gain
a military advantage from the use of land mines. Yet in order to
fully appreciate the principle of proportionality, one must consider
the requirement that civilian casualties be minimized.
It is universally acknowledged that in modern warfare
civilians must be protected to the fullest extent possible and must
67. U.S. ARMY PAPER, supra note 45, at 3-5; William J. Fenrick, Note, New
Developments in the Law Concerning the Use of Conventional Weapons in Armed Conflict,
19 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 229, 242 (1981).
68. U.S. ARMY PAPER, supra note 45, at 3.
69. See infra notes 124-41 and accompanying text.
70. THE ARMS PROJECI, supra note 3, at 293.
71. Id. at 28-29.
72. DEBORAH SHAPLEY, PROMISE AND POWER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ROBERT
MCNAMARA 414 (1993). In 1965, an even higher figure of 65-70% of all Marine Corps
casualties in Vietnam was attributed to land mines. THE ARMS PROJECr, supra note 3,
at 18.
73. General Alfred Gray, Jr., U.S.M.C. ret., Address before the American Defense
Preparedness Association, (Sept. 7-9, 1993), partially reprinted in THE ARMS PROJECT,
supra note 3, at 339.
74. Id.
1995]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
never become the deliberate targets of military weapons. This
doctrine was recognized in The Paquete Habana,75 where the
United States Supreme Court held that a coastal vessel with no
role in a war enjoys immunity from attack and capture.76 The
1923 Hague Draft Rules of Air Warfare sought to limit non-
battlefield targets to those that serve military purposes, such as
military works, munitions and arms factories, military supplies, and
military communication and transportation lines.77 Armed forces
manuals specify these same limitations.78 Even when attacking
military targets, unreasonable damage to civilian values must be
avoided.79 Moreover, armed forces must take all possible precau-
tions to spare civilians and civilian interests.8 0
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2444 of 1969
("Resolution 2444") clearly summarizes the international legal
requirement of minimizing harm to civilians:
(a) That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited;
(b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian
population as such;
75. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
76. Id at 677.
77. Rules of Aerial Warfare, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra
note 57, at 123-35. This treaty was never adopted, but is regarded to be an authoritative
declaration of customary international law. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra
note 57, at 121. See also Protection of Civilian Populations Against Bombing From The
Air In Case Of War, Sept. 30, 1938, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 49, at
222 (recognizing that "[olbjectives aimed at from the air must be legitimate military
objectives and must be identifiable").
78. These military manuals specify that where the principle of proportionality applies:
there must be a reasonable relationship between lawful destructiveness and ancillary or
collateral efforts; injury to civilians must not be excessive to concrete and direct military
advantage expected to be gained. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 65, at 3-4; U.S.
DEPT. OF THE AIR FORCE, JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. ACTIVITIES, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS, 5-7 (1976) [hereinafter AIR
FORCE PAMPHLET]. Military manuals are important sources of international custom.
Theodor Meron, Determining Customary International Law Relative to the Conduct of
Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 471,491-92
(1987). International custom is a source of international law when it reflects established
usage or practice, done pursuant to the legal conviction that it is required, as is reflected
in the foregoing military manuals. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945 I.C.J.
Stat., Art. 38(1)(b), 48.
79. FRITS KALSHOVEN, THE LAW OF WARFARE 61, 66 (1973).
80. Charles Allen, Civilian Starvation and Relief During Armed Conflict: The Modem
Humanitarian Law, 19 GA. J. INT'L & COmp. L. 1, 30 (1989).
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(c) That distinction must be made at all times between persons
taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian popula-
tion to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possi-
ble.8
1
Resolution 2444 is generally regarded as authoritative,' and is
recognized by the United States as a correct statement of existing
customary international law.
83
Likewise, Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts to the 1949 Geneva Conventions for
the Protection of War Victims ("Protocol 1")' reiterates the
requirement that civilian populations be protected from military
operations. Protocol I states, in part:
Military operations shall be directed only against military objec-
tives, and not against civilians.85
The civilian population shall not be the object of attack.'
Attacks are prohibited which cause incidental loss of civilian life
and injury to civilians, that would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.'
81. U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 50, U.N. Doe. A/7218 (1969). Clause (a)
is taken literally from Article 22 of The 1899 Hague Convention (II).
82. Richard Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic Questions, 2
HUM. RTS. J. 557, 559 (1969). See II HOWARD LEVIE, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 81 (1986).
83. Arthur Rovine, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 118, 122 (1973); Michael Matheson, The United States Position on
the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949
Geneva Convention, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 419, 424-26 (1987).
84. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 57, at 389 [hereinafter Protocol I].
Protocol I is generally agreed upon by scholars as the codification of customary
international law. Danielle L. Infeld, Note, Precision-Guided Munitions Demonstrated
Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; But is a Country Obligated to Use Precision
Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 109, 118-19 (1992). The United States also acknowledges this, even though
other major economic and military powers have not adopted Protocol I. Id. at 118;
Michael Matheson, supra note 83, at 426; Thomas Murphy, Sanctions and Enforcement of
the Humanitarian Law of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Geneva Protocol I of
1977, 103 MIL. L. REv. 3, 5 (1984). The rules from Protocol I are mirrored in armed
forces publications. AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 78.
85. Protocol I, supra note 84, art. 48.
86. Id. art. 51.2.
87. Id. arts. 51.5(b), 57.2(a)(iii).
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Injury and loss of life to civilians must be minimized in choosing
the methods of attack.88
When a choice is possible between several military objectives,
the objective to be selected shall be the attack which is expected
to cause the least danger to civilian lives.
s9
Although a particular weapon is not specifically outlawed, it
may be employed in a manner that violates the requirement of
minimizing civilian casualties in war. In Shimoda v. State,' the
District Court of Tokyo decided that the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki violated international law and, specifical-
ly, the Draft Rules of Air Warfare of 1923.91 The court stated,
"[a]ny weapon the use of which is contrary to the customs of
civilized countries and to the principles of international law should
ipso facto be deemed to be prohibited even if there is no express
provision in the law.... ,'
Military land mining practices are irreconcilable with the
foregoing requirements to minimize harm to civilians from military
operations. Practical limitations on mine clearance, due to scarce
resources or inability to detect them, lead to the conclusion that
mine use is is inconsistent with the goals of minimizing harm to
civilians. In addition to these limits on mine clearance, there is the
problem of mines which fail to deactivate. Not all land mines
contain deactivation devices. Those equipped with neutralization
or self-destruction devices do not always deactivate.93 Further-
more, deactivation, if effective, may take weeks or even months
after mines are deployed.' This combination of non-deactivation
and delayed deactivation results in an unacceptably high toll upon
civilian life and limb. Clearly, land mine use is inconsistent with
the goal of protecting non-combatants from harm.
C. Eliminating Indiscriminate and Non-Targeted Weapons
The principles of protecting civilians and of using methods of
warfare proportionate to military objectives were developed into
the doctrine that indiscriminate, non-targeted weapons must not be
88. Id. art. 57.2(a)(iii).
89. Id. art. 57.3.
90. Shimoda v. State, 32 INT'L L. REP. 626 (1963).
91. Id at 630-31.
92. Id. at 629.
93. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 28-29.
94. Id.
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used. One commentator stated that the prohibition of weapons
and tactics that cause indiscriminate harm between combatants and
non-combatants is a "core rule" derived from conventional and
customary international law.95  This rule was reflected in the
Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine
Contact Mines that, in part, prohibited unmoored undersea
mines.96 This treaty was to regulate the employment of mines in
naval warfare after such mine use caused indiscriminate harms.97
Protocol I also disapproves indiscriminate use of weapons.9"
Land mines are frequently deployed by aircraft and artil-
lery.' This manner of emplacement provides much less control
over location than laying mines by hand and impairs the ability to
record and mark mine locationsli ° Imprecision in placement,
coupled with failed and delayed activation, establishes the
indiscriminate nature of land mine deployment and, therefore, the
land mine is a weapon that is often non-targeted in its attack.
Accordingly, land mine emplacement conflicts with customary
international legal principles against the indiscriminate use of
weapons. °1
D. Rights of Life and Bodily Integrity
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights identifies the
rights of life, liberty, security of the person, and freedom from
cruel or inhuman treatment as rights protected by international
95. Weston, supra note 54, at 3.
96. Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines,
Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 57, at
87. Article 3 of this treaty requires precautions for the security of peaceful shipping, and
Article 5 requires removal of mines at the close of hostilities. Id arts. 3, 5.
97. These indiscriminate harms involved extensive damage to neutral shipping during
and after the Russo-Japanese War that occurred from 1904 to 1905. DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 57, at 85.
98. "Indiscriminate attacks ["which cannot be directed at a specific military objective"]
are prohibited." Protocol I, supra note 84, art. 51.4(a), (b), 1125 U.N.T.S. 25, 26 (1979).
99. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 10.
100. Id
101. Fenrick, supra note 67, at 243-44. At least with respect to offensively-used land
mines, one scholar has concluded they are illegal non-targeted weapons because there is
no way of ensuring that they would not kill or injure persons protected by law from attack:
"Mines used in this fashion are indiscriminate in their effects, and may as easily explode
under a civilian ... as under a soldier [or] a tank .... " MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE
MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 363 (1959).
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law.1°2 These same rights are reiterated in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights °3 Customary interna-
tional law fully recognizes these rights" 4 and considers them non-
derogable. °5
The United Nations General Assembly recognizes that these
fundamental human rights must be protected during armed
conflict. General Assembly Resolution 2675 (XXV) states,
"Fundamental human rights, as accepted by international law and
laid down in international instruments, continue to apply fully in
situations of armed conflicts."" In Nicaragua v. United
States," the International Court of Justice condemned the laying
of submarine mines in a manner likely to injure or kill innocent
civilians. In doing so, the court stated that the prohibition of
violence to life and person, including murder, mutilation, cruel
treatment, and torture of non-combatants is a minimum standard
applicable to both international and internal armed conflicts.'0
The same reasoning should apply to the laying of land mines
that create the likelihood of civilian injury or death. The non-
derogable individual values of life, liberty, personal security, and
freedom from torture and cruel or inhuman treatment yield only
102. G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
103. G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1961).
104. Myres McDougal, Law and Minimum Public World Order: Armed Conflict in
Larger Context, 3 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 21, 30 (1984); Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 114 (June 27).
105. A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 226, n.19
(1982); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, To RESPEcr AND TO ENSURE: STATE OBLIGATIONS
AND PERMISSIBLE DEROGATIONS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72,
78-86 (L. Henkin ed., 1981).
106. G.A. Res. 2675(XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28 at 76, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970).
107. 1986 I.C.J. 114 (June 27).
108. Id. This formulation is derived from Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
Relating to the Victims of International Armed Conflicts. Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S.
287 (1950). The prohibition is extended to non-international conflicts by Protocol II of
1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: Protocol.
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 502 (1981).
Article 3 duties are mandatory and apply in all circumstances. Parties have not only the
negative obligation to abstain from violating these duties, but also have the affirmative
obligation to enforce them. A breach of these particular duties appears to require penal
punishment.
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to the taking of life and the infliction of injury for lawful military
purposes.1°9 In light of the elevated values ascribed to human
life and bodily integrity by these human rights principles, laying
land mines that are expected to maim or kill civilians can never
serve a lawful military purpose.11°
E. Domestic Law
Domestic laws of nations do not assist in interpreting
international treaties. Nevertheless, domestic laws from legal
systems that recognize and protect individual human rights
doctrines may clarify the aforementioned international law
principles of individual human rights, minimizing harm to civilians
and use of proportionate force.'
English common law originally permitted the use of mechani-
cal devices, such as spring guns and booby traps, designed to cause
death or great bodily harm to persons." Anglo-American
jurisdictions, however, eventually rejected the legality of these
practices, imposing liability for killing or injuring an innocent
person, regardless of the reasonableness of the plan to foil a
109. Allen, supra note 80, at 52.
110. Protection of the human environment is an additional principle of international law
that should be mentioned. Article 35.3 of Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions proscribes methods of warfare that are expected to cause widespread, long-
term, and severe damage to the natural environment. Article 54.2 of this treaty prohibits
rendering useless croplands and grazing lands, and Article 55.1 prohibits means of warfare
that may be expected to cause damage to the natural environment and thereby to
prejudice human health or survival. It reasonably can be maintained that the mining of
livestock rangelands and arable fields, done with great frequency in recent years and
resulting in tens of thousands of deaths and injuries to agricultural workers and subsistence
farmers, is in contravention to these provisions of Protocol I. See G.A. Res. 71, U.N.
GAOR, 35th Sess., 83d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 48 at 132, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980)
(recognizing that the presence of mines "on the territories of certain developing countries
seriously impedes their development efforts and entails loss of life and property").
111. Mary Dominick, Toward a Community Bill of Rights: The European Community
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 639, 653-57 (1990-91); See
David Edward, Constitutional Rules of Community Law in ECC Competition Cases, 13
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 111, 113 (1989).
112. Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1, 13 (1877).
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burglary."' The Supreme Court of Alabama explained the
principle underlying this rule:
It is a settled principle of our law, that every one has the right
to defend his person, and property, against unlawful violence,
and may employ as much force as is necessary to prevent its
invasion .... But when it is said a man may rightfully use as
much force as is necessary for the protection of his person and
property, it must be recollected the principle is subject to this
most important qualification, that he shall not, except in
extreme cases inflict great bodily harm, or endanger human life
.... The preservation of human life, and of limb and member
from grievous harm, is of more importance to society than the
protection of property.114
A similar rationale can be applied in a rule prohibiting the use
of land mines. Land mines serve to hinder the movement of an
enemy force and its access to land and military bases."' Such a
purpose could justify the use of land mines to eliminate troops and
weapons that threaten to destroy military installations. Land
mines, however, cause death or great bodily harm to unwary and
innocent persons in a manner similar to spring guns and booby
traps. Such harm to civilians is not necessary for the protection of
military facilities and the surrounding land. This rationale of
domestic law, therefore, offers further support for the proposition
that the use of land mines conflicts with individual human rights
when they create a danger to non-combatants.
113. Id. at 13-14. One should note that an exception to liability for such an act was
recognized in United States v. Gilliam, 25 Fed. Cas. 1319, No. 15, 205a (C.C.D.C. 1882)
(recognizing an exception to justify the use of such devices in occupied dwellings at night).
This exception, however, is not uniformally recognized in common law jurisdictions around
the world. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 3.06(5) (allowing use of a protective device only
if reasonable under the circumstances and the device is not designed to cause death or
serious bodily harm); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 941.20(2)(b)(1958) (mandating a felony charge for
setting a spring gun); Geoffery W.R. Palmer, The Iowa Spring Gun Case: A Study in
American Gothic, 56 IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1244-45 (1971).
114. Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1, 14 (1877).
115. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 21.
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IV. 1980 CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TREATY RULES ON LAND
MINES
Protocol II of the Conventional Weapons Treaty" 6 deals
with "mines, booby-traps, and similar devices." Thirty-six nations
ratified the Conventional Weapons Treaty, including Protocol
11.117 The United States and the United Kingdom, however, have
not ratified the Conventional Weapons Treaty. Additionally, a
number of nations that either are recognized as being militarily-
advanced or actively produce or deploy land mines have also failed
to either sign or ratify the treaty.1 8 Furthermore, a combination
of exceptions, limitations, loop-holes, and admonitory (as distin-
guished from prohibitory) clauses renders this treaty ineffec-
tive."9
The general restrictions enumerated in Article 3120 reflect
116. Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and other Devices, 1342
U.N.T.S. 163 (1983) [hereinafter Protocol II].
117. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 261 n.1.
118. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, STATUS
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1993, at 853-54, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.E/12, U.N. Sales No.
E.94.V.11 (1994).
119. "The Protocol's complex rules, discretionary language, and broad exceptions and
qualifications to its general prohibitions further limit its utility." THE ARMS PROJECT,
supra note 3, at 263.
120. Article 3 provides:




2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this Article
applies, either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against the civilian
population as such or against individual civilians.
3. The indiscriminate use of weapons to which this Article applies is prohibited.
Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons:
(a) Which is not on, or directed against, a military objective; or
(b) Which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) Which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.
4. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects
of weapons to which this Article applies. Feasible precautions are those
precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military consider-
ations.
Protocol II, supra note 116, art. 3, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 163.
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many of the aforementioned customary international law princi-
ples. These include prohibitions against directing weapons against
civilian populations, indiscriminate use of weapons, and dispropor-
tionate harm to civilians.1 21  Unfortunately, any benefit gained
from these general pronouncements is overwhelmed by the
extreme inadequacies of the specific provisions contained in
Articles 4, 5, 7, and 9.
Article 4 prohibits the use of hand-laid mines 2 in areas
where civilians are concentrated, except where ground combat is
occurring or imminent, where the area contains military tar-
gets,12 or where warning signs or similar measures are employed.
The prohibition, therefore, is virtually consumed by these excep-
tions.
Even these generally protective provisions contain an enormous flaw. Article 3.4
provides that only "all feasible precautions" need be taken to protect civilians. Military
commanders, of course, should be expected frequently to take no measures at all to
protect civilians by finding none were feasible under the circumstances. See Burns
Carnahan, The Law of Land Mine Warfare: Protocol H to the United Nations Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons, 105 MIL. L. REv. 73, 81 (1984).
121. Art. 3, supra note 120.
122. Article 4 provides:
1. This Article applies to:
(a) Mines other than remotely delivered mines;
(b) Booby-traps; and
(c) Other devices.
2. It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article applies in any city, town,
village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which
combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to be
imminent, unless either:
(a) They are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective
belonging to or under the control of an adverse party; or
(b) Measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects, for
example, the posting of warning signs, the posting of sentries, the
issue of warnings or the provision of fences.
Protocol II, supra note 116, art. 4, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 163.
The treaty is silent as to the meaning of civilian or civilian population. Because the
Conventional Weapons Treaty was intended to supplement the general rules on conducting
warfare in Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and because the drafters
of the treaty turned regularly to the latter document for definitions, it is regarded as
influential in providing definitions for the Conventional Weapons Treaty. THE ARMS
PROJECT, supra note 3, at 284-85 & n.67. In Protocol I of 1977, civilians are defined as
persons not members of armed forces or organized armed groups. Art. 50. Thus, a person
who gives food to members of the armed forces remains a civilian. THE ARMS PROJECT,
supra note 3, at 285.
123. Military objective is defined in Article 2.1 to be any object which makes an
effective contribution to military action, the elimination of which offers a definite military
advantage.
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Article 5 regulates the use of remotely delivered mines.124
Pursuant to this article, remotely delivered mines may be used only
in areas containing military targets.1 25 Their location, in certain
instances, must be recorded, or, alternatively, they must neutralize
or self-destruct once "the mine will no longer serve the military
purpose" for which it was emplaced. 126  Although these
provisions take on a more mandatory character, Article 5 substan-
tially defers to military interests and neglects the concern against
harm to civilians. For example, the article requires advance
warnings of dangers posed by deployed mines where civilians may
be affected, "unless circumstances do not permit."2 7 Such
advance warnings can, therefore, be simply neglected by reason of
unfavorable circumstances. Furthermore, Article 5 does not
explicitly set forth the manner by which civilians should be
warned.
128
Employing self-neutralizing or self-destructing mechanisms is
not necessarily a more effective alternative to recording remotely
delivered mines. The failure rate of these mechanisms is often as
high as ten percent.1 29 Mine clearance has over a 99.5% success
rate. 30 Self-neutralizing mines cannot confidently be handled as
124. Article 5 provides:
1. The use of remotely delivered mines is prohibited unless such mines are only
used within an area which is itself a military objective or which contains military
objectives, and unless:
(a) Their location can be accurately recorded in accordance with
Article 7(1)(a); or
(b) An effective neutralizing mechanism is used on each such mine,
that is to say, a self-actuating mechanism which is designed to
render a mine harmless or cause it to destroy itself when it is
anticipated that the mine will no longer serve the military purpose
for which it was placed in position, or a remotely-controlled
mechanism which is designed to render harmless or destroy a mine
when the mine no longer serves the military purpose for which it
was placed in position.
2. Effective advance warning shall be given of any delivery or dropping of
remotely delivered mines which may affect the civilian population, unless
circumstances do not permit.




128. It has been argued that the general rule in Article 3.4 of taking all feasible
precautions to protect civilians could impose a post-mining notification duty. Carnahan,
supra note 120, at 80.
129. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 345 n.22.
130. Id. at 237.
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long as there is any question about the effectiveness of the
neutralizing feature. Moreover, the explosive charge of these
mines becomes increasingly dangerous as chemical degradation of
the charge renders it unstable. Additionally, no method exists to
prevent civilian casualties before and at the moment of
self-destruction.131 These shortcomings of self-neutralizing or
self-destructing mechanisms further demonstrate the inadequacy of
Article 5.
The recording provisions of Article 7132 are also grossly
inadequate. This article only requires the recording of pre-planned
mine fields.133 Such plans are extremely detailed and formulated
well before the mines are actually laid.'34 Commentators have
suggested that for the vast majority of mine fields, such detailed
plans could not exist.135 Furthermore, Article 7 fails to require
131. Id. at 53, 345 n.22.
132. Article 7 provides:
1. The parties to a conflict shall record the location of:
(a) All pre-planned minefields laid by them; and
(b) All areas in which they have made large-scale and pre-planned use
of booby-traps.
2. The parties shall endeavor to ensure the recording of the location of all
other minefields, mines and booby-traps which they have laid or placed in
position.
3. All such records shall be retained by the parties who shall:
(a) Immediately after the cessation of active hostilities:
(i) Take all necessary and appropriate measures, including the use
of such records, to protect civilians from the effects of
minefields, mines and booby-traps; and either
(ii) In cases where the forces of neither party are in the territory
of the adverse party, make available to each other and to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations all information in
their possession concerning the location of minefields, mines
and booby-traps in the territory of the adverse party; or
(iii) Once complete withdrawal of the forces of the parties from the
territory of the adverse party has taken place, make available
to the adverse party and to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations all information in their possession concerning
the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps in the
territory of the adverse party;
(b) When a United Nations force or mission performs functions in any
area, make available to the authority mentioned in Article 8 such
information as is required by that Article;
(c) Whenever possible by mutual agreement, provide for the release of
information concerning the location of minefields, mines and
booby-traps, particularly in agreements governing the cessation of
hostilities.
Protocol II, supra note 116, art. 7, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 163.
133. Id. art. 7.1.(a).
134. Carnahan, supra note 120, at 84.
135. Id
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the recording of the composition and pattern of the mine field or
the location of individual mines.
1 36
As inadequate as they may be, the record keeping provisions
of the Conventional Weapons Treaty envision at least some
militaries properly and effectively identifying mine fields in order
to protect civilians. In practice, however, this objective has not
been attained. Since the treaty's publication, no armed force is
known to have consistently and accurately recorded the location
of mine fields. The British in the Falklands War, for example,
kept precise maps of mine fields.137  Yet, these maps have
proven to be grossly inaccurate.13
Protocol II provides for mandatory disclosure of the location
of mine fields. The treaty, however, contains phrases that allow
parties to evade this requirement. Article 7, for example, provides
that after cessation of hostilities the parties shall release informa-
tion concerning the location of mine fields "whenever possible by
mutual agreement." '39 Article 9 provides that after cessation of
hostilities, "the parties shall endeavor to reach agreement" to
remove the mine fields or render them ineffective."4  Such
facially ineffectual rules are justly condemned as "merely formal"
and "purely admonitory," their purpose being "to cover up the
inability or unwillingness to ... safeguard the minimum standard
of civilization.'
141
A further limitation of the Conventional Weapons Treaty is
that it only applies to international conflicts and certain wars of
liberation.42 The treaty does not govern the use of land mines
in civil wars and other internal conflicts.
The Conventional Weapons Treaty was drafted at two
preparatory conferences, held in 1978 and 1979, and at a two-stage
136. Id.
137. THE ARMS PROJECr, supra note 3, at 262, 293.
138. Id
139. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, supra
note 118, art. 7.3(c) (emphasis added).
140. Id art. 9 (emphasis added).
141. 2 GEORGE SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNA-
TIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 11 (1968); Carnahan, supra note 120, at 82-83.
142. Article 1 incorporates by reference Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims. Conventional Weapons Treaty, supra
note 5, art. 1, § 3.
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conference, which occurred in 1979 and 1980.143 At these confer-
ences, it was widely understood that land mines would be used as
tactical defensive weapons with the primary purpose of channeling
enemy forces into more easily-defended areas, denying to the
enemy positions that could not be covered by friendly troops, and
protecting friendly troops.1" This expectation that land mines
would be primarily used as defensive tactical weapons, however,
is clearly outdated. In the 1980s and 1990s, mines have been used
regularly as offensive weapons, often beyond the battlefield.
1 45
The conferences did not foresee the evolving technology of land
mines, including the development of contemporary mines that are
practically impossible to locate. Additionally, the conference
delegates probably never imagined that technological advances
would enable manufacturers to design mines that explode in
response to any attempt to disarm them.
146
While the Conventional Weapons Treaty forbids, in general
terms, indiscriminate use of land mines and limits their use in
achieving military objectives,147 the aforementioned provisions of
the treaty render these prohibitions ineffective. The discussions
preceding the treaty's publication did not focus on the potential
widespread harm to civilians resulting from land mines.1" These
discussions also failed to address the fact that mines remain active
for many years after the end of the conflict during which the mines
were laid.149  Most importantly, they failed to emphasize the
shocking and excessive harm to human beings unleashed by these
weapons.15 °
In a practical sense, therefore, the provisions of the Conven-
tional Weapons Treaty related to land mines have proved to be a
dismal failure in carrying out the doctrines of customary interna-
tional law. Land mines often are targeted purposely against
143. Carnahan, supra note 120, at 75. The conferences were preceded and influenced
by two conferences of government experts in 1974 and 1976 convened by the International
Committee of the Red Cross. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 265 n.9.
144. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 270.
145. I& at 270. Customary international law permits defensive and prohibits offensive
uses of land mines. Greenspan, supra note 101, at 363.
146. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
147. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, supra
note 121, art. 3.
148. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 271.
149. I&
150. Ia& at 272.
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civilians. Mines have been used without taking any precautions to
protect civilians, even where harm to civilian interests outweighs
any possible military advantage. The surging use of land mines,
the developing technologies that render mines more difficult to
detect, and the numerous civilian casualties from land mine
explosions since the publication of the treaty clearly demonstrate
that the Conventional Weapons Treaty has been unable to curb
the atrocities that undermine established principles of international
law.1
51
V. TOWARD AN ABSOLUTE BAN OF LAND MINES
Customary international legal principles, coupled with the
provisions set forth in Article 3 of the Conventional Weapons
Treaty, are irreconcilable with the less restrictive provisions of
Articles 4 through 9. This view of the interaction between Article
3 and Articles 4 through 9, unfortunately, runs afoul of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius,15 a widely-applied doctrine in interna-
tional adjudication.1 3  Furthermore, it can be argued that the
flexibility of the less-restrictive provisions constitutes the essence
of the treaty and accurately reflects the compromises reached by
the delegates through debate and balloting during the conferenc-
es. 154 Perhaps a thoughtful and conscientious war crimes tribunal
passing judgment upon actions of military commanders could
resolve this interpretive dilemma. If defendants before such a
tribunal strictly adhered to the provisions of Articles 4 through 9
of the treaty's Protocol II, but, nevertheless, violated principles of
international law by causing the slaughter and maiming of a
tremendous number of civilians, it is questionable that they would
151. Id at 263, 353. Mines have been used in recent years for the purpose of
terrorizing civilians and controlling their movements in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia,
Somalia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Kurdistan, and elsewhere. Id
at 23.
152. "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" means that when certain things or persons
are specified in a law, contract, or will, there is an intention to exclude all others from its
operation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
153. LASSO OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW § 554, at 954 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th
ed. 1955).
154. Treaty provisions ordinarily are not to be held meaningless or ineffective. "[Y]et
it must be borne in mind that on occasions the absence of a full measure of effectiveness
is the direct result of the intention of the parties. . . [who] were unable to agree on a more
complete degree of efficacy of the provisions of the treaty." Id § 554, at 955.
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be convicted.155 The failure of existing international law to
eliminate the harm caused by land mines necessitates the drafting
and ratifying of a comprehensive treaty that abolishes the use of
land mines.
The analogous character of poisonous gases or bacteriological
warfare and land mines is readily apparent. The 1899 Hague
Declaration 2 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases ("Hague Declara-
tion 2") condemned projectiles used solely for spreading poison
gas.1 56 This treaty was first circumvented by the use of cylinders,
instead of projectiles, to spread gas.157  The widespread use of
poisonous gases during World War 1158 shows that militaries
eventually ignored the Hague Declaration 2. In 1925, 115
nations 5 9 adopted the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bac-
teriological Methods of Warfare ("1925 Geneva Protocol")."6
This treaty is regarded as a part of customary international law16 1
and only a few violations have occurred in the seventy years since
its adoption. 62 The ineffective control measures presented by
the 1899 treaty on gas projectiles closely resembles the inadequate
control of the Conventional Weapons Treaty on the use of land
155. At least two judges of an international tribunal that decided the fate of military
officers charged of war crimes after World War II believed that waging aggressive war was
not a crime in violation of international law if treaties do not clearly proscribe such an act.
See In Re Hirota, 15 ANN. DIG. 356, 374-75 (1948) (Roling, J., dissenting) (concluding that
"aggressive war, although perhaps the subject of moral condemnation, was 'not considered
a true crime ... for lack of those conditions in international relations on which such a view
could be based."'); Id. at 375-76 (Pal, J., dissenting) (expressing the view "that the General
Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 1928 did not render criminal or unlawful any
category of war and that the right of war was not justiciable according to any rule of
customary or conventional international law;... " and "that the killing of enemy persons
carried out under the authority of the State amino belligerendi in the course of waging an
aggressive war cannot amount to murder").
156. 1899 Hague Declaration 2 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, reprinted
in DOCUMENiS ON THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 57, at 36.
157. Levie, supra note 59, at 1194.
158. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 55, at 35.
159. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICrS, supra note 49, at 117-21.
160. 1925 Geneva Protocol, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra
note 57, at 138.
161. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 57, at 138.
162. The Italian government used poison gas in its claimed territory of Ethiopia in the
1930s. Japan is reported to have used poison gas in China in the 1930's. Use of poison
gas during World War II has never been confirmed. Mustard gas is believed to have been
used by Egypt (then United Arab Republic) in Yemen in 1967. Iraq used poison gas
against its indigenous Kurdish population in the 1980s. Levie, supra note 59, at 1195-97.
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mines. This ineffective measure of control invites evasion and
violation. A treaty similar to the 1925 Geneva Protocol must be
adopted to effectively curb the harm inflicted upon civilians. Like
bacteriological agents, land mines can cause unintended, yet
extremely injurious, effects on non-combatants. The 1925 Geneva
Protocol also prohibited bacteriological warfare. 16 3 This prohibi-
tion has also been adhered to by militaries.164  In 1972, 51
nations adopted the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which
banned the production and possession of bacterial agents not
designed for peaceful use, and their means of delivery.1 65 Draw-
ing from these examples, one should expect that an absolute
prohibition on the possession and use of land mines would achieve
similar recognition and adherence.
V. CONCLUSION
Individual nations have begun taking actions that may lead to
a total ban on the possession and use of land mines. The Land
Mine Moratorium Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1992,
banned the sale, export, and transfer abroad of land mines.
166
The Land Mine Moratorium Extension Act, passed in 1993,
extended the law for an additional three years.167  Congress
found that land mines "have been used indiscriminately in
dramatically increasing numbers" and that "[n]oncombatant
civilians, including tens of thousands of children, have been the
primary victims.""
In 1993, President Mitterand of France announced that his
country would voluntarily abstain from exporting antipersonnel
land mines and called on other states to proclaim a moratori-
163. 1925 Geneva Protocol, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra
note 57, at 140.
164. Levie, supra note 59, at 1195-96.
165. 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062. The development of this treaty stemmed from
the fear that the 1925 treaty might not be adequate to deal with contemporary methods
of warfare. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS TODAY 135, 138 (Erhard Geissler ed.,
1986).
166. Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 1365, 57 C.F.R. 228 (1992) (amending National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993).
167. Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 1423, 32 C.F.R. 254.4 (1994) (amending National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994).
168. Landmine Moratorium Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 1365, 106 Stat. 2561
(1992).
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um." The Belgian government announced that it has stopped
all production of antipersonnel land mines and will not permit
their transportation within Belgium.170  In 1994, the Italian
Parliament passed legislation ceasing the production and exporta-
tion of land mines during the 1995 international conference to
review the Conventional Weapons Treaty.171  Sweden also
banned non-detectable and non-self-destructing mines.172  Ten
other nations banned land mine exportation during 1994 and
1995.173 The European Parliament passed a resolution in 1992
demanding that all member states declare a five-year moratorium
on exporting mines and mine emplacement training. 7 4 Finally,
the United Nations passed resolutions calling for a moratorium on
the export of land mines and for the eventual elimination of these
weapons. 175  These unilateral actions described above are a
fitting prelude to multilateral prohibition of land mine use.
An international conference is scheduled in 1995 to review the
Conventional Weapons Treaty.176  This conference will present
an historic opportunity for the adoption of a treaty that totally
bans the production, possession, and use of land mines. No lesser
measure will ensure adherence to fundamental doctrines of
customary international law, and no action short of that will stop
the needless slaughter and mutilation of civilians all over the
world.
169. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 323-24.
170. CONG. REC. S11392 (Daily ed. 10, 1993) (reported by Sen. Leahy).
171. Evelyn Leopold, United Nations: U.N. Assembly Asks For Worldwide Ban On
Landmines, RUETER GEN. NEWS, Dec. 16, 1993.
172. Id.
173. U.S. Mission to U.N., Press Release No. 165-(94), Nov. 3, 1994 (reported by Sen.
Leahy).
174. THE ARMS PROJECT, supra note 3, app. 13. The resolution also asks member
states to influence the United Nations Security Council to treat mine clearance as a matter
of great urgency. See id.
175. U.N. GAOR 48/75 12/16/93; U.N. A/C. 1/49/L.19 12/15/94.
176. Members of the U.N. Conventional Weapons Convention will meet in Geneva in
September, 1995 to discuss the treaty's land mine protocol. Theresa Hitchens, U.S. Land
Mine Plan Faces Two-Sided Criticism, DEF. NEWS, Nov. 14, 1994, at 12.
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